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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - July 24, 1979 
SECTION ONE 
1. Although Tyrone Tyrant was a successful businessman in 
Charlottesville, some people questioned the manner in which he 
achieved his success. Among his other enterprises, he owned a 
newspaper business, which he operated as a sole proprietorship. 
In January 1978, he hired Sonny Slander as editor of the newspaper. 
Nine months after he was hired as editor, Slander published 
a novel which he had written. The protagonist of this novel was 
a ruthless tycoon who rose to the top of the business world by 
using unethical practices. 
When he read this novel, Tyrant was incensed. Tyrant filed 
an action at law for damages against Slander in the Circuit Court 
for the City of Charlottesville in October, 1978. To his motion 
for judgment, Tyrant attached as an exhibit a purported written 
employment contract between Tyrant and Slander. In the first count 
of the motion for judgment Tyrant alleged that Slander breached 
a provision of the contract which provided that Slander would take 
no action which would subject Tyrant to public embarrassment. By 
the second count Tyrant alleged that readers of the novel would 
identify Tyrant with the protagonist and thus assume that he,· 
Tyrant, was equally ruthless and unethical. For this reason, ac-
cording to the allegation, the publication of the book constituted 
libel by Slander against Tyrant. 
Slander filed a motion to require Tyrant to elect to proceed 
on either (1) his contract count or (2) his tort count. The Court 
ruled that there was no misjoinder of actions and that Tyrant could 
proceed on both counts. 
By his grounds of defense Slander alleged that he had never 
signed the purported written contract and that actually what 
appeared to be h.is signature thereon was a forgery. In addition, 
he alleged that his conduct in writing and publishing the novel 
was protected by a provision of the purported contract stating that 
Slander was permitted to publish such books, articles and essays 
as he might desire dealing with such topics as he might desire. 
At the trial, Tyrant contended that Slander should not be 
permitted to present to the jury "the inconsistent and contradictory 
contentions" that (1) his signature on the contract was a forgery 
and (2) his conduct was protected by the terms of the contract. 
The Court ruled that Slander could present evidence on only one of 
these defenses and required him to elect one. 
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(a) Did the Court rule correctly in permitting Tyrant to 
proceed on both the contract count and the tort count? 
(b) Did the Court rule correctly in prohibiting Slander 
from presenting evidence with respect to both the purported forgery 
and the defense based upon the terms of the written contract? 
";~ * * * * 
2. Arnie Gibson, a resident of the City of Charlottesville, 
purchased a new automobile in December, 1978 ·.from Ralph's, Inc. 
("Ralph's"), a Virginia corporation with its only place of business 
and its registered office located in Newport News. Several weeks 
after .the purchase, Gibson was operating his automobile in the City 
of Charlottesville. As he rounded a curve, he encountered in his 
lane of travel an oncoming vehicle driven by Fred Lopez, a resident 
of the City of Roanoke. Gibson veered to the right to avoid Lopez 
and applied his brakes. The brakes failed to work, however, and 
Gibson's vehicle left the right side of the road and struck a 
tree. He sustained serious personal injuries and his automobile 
was demolished. 
Gibson subsequently instituted an action at law in the Circuit 
Court of the City: of Roanoke against Lopez and Ralph's seeking to 
recover damages for his accident. His motion alleged that the 
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Lopez and 
the negligence of Ralph's. The motion also alleged that Ralph's 
was liable for the accident because it had breached its warranties. 
By his grounds of defense Lopez denied liability for the accident. 
Ralph's filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue or in the 
alternative to transfer the case to a permissible venue, asserting 
that permissible venue existed only in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Charlottesville where the cause of action alleging negli-
gence arose or in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News 
where the cause of action alleging breach of warranty arose and 
where Ralph's conducts business and had its registered office and 
where the goods which were the subject of the breach of warranty 
action were delivered. 
Before the Court ruled on Ralp~'s motion, Gibson took a nonsuit. 
Gibson then instituted an action at law against Lopez and Ralph's 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville based on iden-
tical allegations. Lopez and Ralph's filed separate motions to 
dismiss on the ground that the Circuit Court of the City of Char-
lottesville was precluded from trying the case against them. 
(a) If Gibson had not taken a nonsuit, how should the Circuit 
Court of the City of Roanoke have ruled on Ralph's motion to dismiss 
or to transfer the case for improper venue? 
(b) How should the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville 
rule on the motions of Lopez and Ralph's to dismiss? 
* * * * * 
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3. Defendant was charged with burglary and grand larceny 
in two separate indictments in the Circuit Court for the City of 
Norfolk. Both charges arose out of a single set of alleged facts. 
The Commonwealth elected to try Defendant on the grand larceny 
charge first. 
At the trial the Commonwealth presented evidence that, 
shortly after midnight on the night of the crime, someone broke 
the,lock on the back door of the occupied residence of Defendant's 
next door neighbor, entered the residence, and removed from it 
certain rare coins worth at least $10,000. The Conrrnonwealth's 
evidence also showed that few people would have known the value 
of the stolen coins but that Defendant possessed this knowledge; 
that Defendant had long admired his neighbor's coin collection 
and knew where it was stored; and that the thief also knew where 
the coins were stored, since only the storage place of the coins 
was disturbed during the crime. The Commonwealth also presented 
evidence that the stolen coins were discovered in an unlocked 
storage shed behind Defendant's house on the day after the crime. 
Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge of grand larceny 
and presented, as his sole defense, witnesses who testified that 
he left Norfolk the day before the alleged theft to attend a week-
long convention of collectors of coins in Los Angeles. 
The jury found Defendant innocent of grand larceny. 
Shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth brought Defendant to 
trial on the charge of burglary. At the start of the second trial, 
Defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the 
double jeopardy provisions of the Virginia and United States Con-
?titutions barred the second prosecution. The Court overruled the 
motion, to which action Defendant objected and excepted. The same 
evidence was presented tothe jury in the second trial concerning 
the alibi defense of Defendant. This time the jury found Defendant 
guilty. 
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Defendant (who had 
by this time obtained a new lawyer), pressed the double jeopardy 
point and for the first time urged that the prosecution for burglary 
should have been barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
since the jury in the prosecution f~r grand larceny had accepted 
his alibi defen~e. · 
(a) How should the Supreme Court rule on the double jeopardy 
defense? 
(b) How should the Supreme Court rule on the collateral 
estoppel defense? 
> 
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4. Break N. Enter was arrested in Bedford County on a 
warrant charging that on December 1, 1978, in Bedford County he 
(1) "did unlawfully and feloniously break and enter the property 
of Vic Timm with the intent to commit larceny therein, and with 
the use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of Section 18.2-91 
of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended, and (2) did unlawfully 
and feloniously rob Vic Timm by violence or putting him in fear 
by threatening in violation of Section 18.2-58 of the 1950 Code 
of Virginia, as amended." · 
During Enter' s preliminary hearing on December 4, 1978, _his 
attorney made a plea bargain with the Assistant Commonwealth's 
Attorney who was conducting the case on behalf of the Commonwealth. 
Thereafter the defense attorney and his client cooperated fully 
with the Commonwealth. The agreement was that Enter would be 
found guilty of the misdemeanor of assault and battery and given 
twelve months in jail, with four months suspended. The other 
charges would be dropped. 
The Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney and the defense attorney 
advised the Judge of the General District Court of Bedford County 
of this agreement, and the Judge amended the warrant to read "that 
on December 1, 1978, Enter did unlawfully assault and batter Vic 
Timm .... " The Judge then noted on the face of the warrant that 
on the basis of his guilty plea, the defendant had been found _ 
guilty of assauLt and battery and sentenced to serve twelve·months 
in jail w~th four months suspended. 
Following this disposition of the case, there was substantial 
public outcry about the handling of the matter. Apparently in 
response to that outcry, the Commonwealth's Attorney submitted to 
the grand jury an indictment charging that Enter on December 1, 
1978, did "unlawfully and feloniously break and enter in the night-
time the dwelling house of Vic Timm with intent to commit larceny 
or other felony therein." Although Enter relied on his plea 
bargaining agreement with the Commonwealth, the jury found him 
guilty of burglary and sentenced him to ten years confinement in 
the penitentiary. 
Enter's attorney appealed this conviction to the Supreme Court 
of Virginia. The only assignment of error involved the validity 
of the plea bargaining defense whic~ he had properly asserted in 
the trial court .. 
How ought the Supreme Court of Virginia to decide the case? 
( 
~ / 
";~ * * * i~ 
5. .Due to your outstanding reputation in the field of 
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure and your knowledge of the 
Securities Exchange Act, Lawyer associates you in what he 
anticipates will be complex federal securities lit-igation. His 
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' client, Joe Anxious, a resident of the City of Richmond, purchased 
certain corporate stock from Tom Easy, a resident of the City of 
Charlottesville. In connection with the sale Anxious gave Easy a 
promissory note for $5,000 payable on demand .. Shortly after the 
sale, Anxious obtained information which led him to believe that 
he had been defrauded in the stock sale. You and Lawyer filed 
for Anxious a complaint against Easy in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia at Charlottesville. The 
complaint alleged violations of §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Rule lO(b)-5 promulgated thereunder, and Anxious 
sought damages in the amount of $16,000 for the alleged fraud. 
Easy answered the complaint by denying any fraud in the transaction 
and he filed a counterclaim against Anxious for $5,000, based 
upon the purchase money note. · 
You filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds 
that (a) there was no diversity and a federal question was not 
involved in the counterclaim and (b) the jurisdictional amount was 
not involved. 
How ought the Court to rule on each of the grounds stated in 
the motion to dismiss the counterclaim? 
6. On April 16, 1975, Ralph Seller and Frank Purchaser 
entered into a written contract for the sale by Seller to Purchaser 
of a tract of land located in Russell County, Virginia. On June 
16, 1975, the date agreed upon to complete the transaction, Seller 
refused to accept the purchase price or to execute a deed for the 
property. On January 2, 1979, Purchaser filed a bill of complaint 
in the Circuit Court of Russell County, in which he alleged the 
existence of the contract, Seller's breach by the latter's refusal 
to complete the transaction, and prayed that the Court decree 
specific performance of the contract. 
In due and proper time after service of process upon him, 
Seller, through his counsel, attorney Young, filed his answer 
denying that he was obligated to perform under the contract since 
it involved real estate and was not .. under seal. Seller also filed 
a plea of the Statute of Limitations. Purchaser promptly filed 
demurrers to Seller's answer and to his plea of the Statute of 
Limita~:~(,~s ,:~ demurrer a proper pleading with which to challenge 
the legal\s~fficiency of the answer? 
(b) Is the demurrer a proper pleading with which to challenge 
the legal sufficiency of the Statute of Limitations? 
(c) What other pleading or pleadings, if any, are available 
t.___; ·. 
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to challenge the answer? 
(d) What other pleading or pleadings, if any, are available 
to challenge the plea of the Statute of Limitations? 
* * * * * 
7. John Giles and Thomas Bland were the owners of adjacent 
lands in Craig County. Eland's land adjoined the highway and he 
constructed a well-paved driveway from his home to the highway. 
Giles' land was separated from the highway by a stream which ran 
under the highway near the point where the two properties adjoined. 
When Giles decided to construct his home in 1957, he sought 
and obtained permission from Bland to use his driveway for the 
purpose of transporting men and materials to his prospective home 
site. After Giles' home had been completed, he continued to use 
Eland's driveway as a means of access to the highway. 
In November, 1978, Giles erected a concrete plant on the 
back part of his property and began hauling his product in large, 
heavily-loaded trucks-across Eland's driveway. This caused the 
pavement on the driveway to break and become full of '_'potholes.',' 
On January 1, 19J9, Bland notified Giles in writing that any-. 
further use by Giles would be treated as a trespass. 
When Giles continued to use the driveway, Bland brought an 
action at law in the Circuit Court of Craig County against Giles 
for $10,000 for damages to the driveway caused by Giles' heavily 
loaded trucks. Giles immediately instituted a suit in equity 
seeking to enjoin Eland's action at law on the grounds that he had 
acquired a prescriptive right to use the driveway. Bland demurred 
to the bill of complaint on the ground that the court could not 
properly enjoin his action at law. 
How should the court rule on the demurrer? 
8. John Webster, the owner of Sunnyside Farm in Campbell 
County, mailed a letter to Jack Pike, a real estate broker in the 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia, containing the following pertinent 
language: 
"I am thinking of selling my farm known as 'Sunny-
side Farm'. You have been recommended to me as being 
a highly capable and industrious real estate broker. ·I, 
therefore, employ you to find a purchaser of my farm at 
the price of $75,000." 
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One week after receipt of Webster's letter, Pike mailed the 
following letter to Webster: 
"In accordance with your recent letter requesting 
me to find a purchaser for 'Sunnyside Farm', I wish to 
advise that I have sold your farm to Thomas Bane for 
$75,000. A contract of sale duly signed by Mr. Bane is 
enclosed herewith for your information. I signed your 
name to the~contract by me as your agent and I also 
signed my name as agent for you. You will note that· 
this contract is very simple and merely provides that 
you agree to sell and Bane agrees to buy Sunnyside Farm 
for $75,000, the sale to be consummated within a reason-
able time from this date.'·' · 
On the day before receiving Pike's letter, Webster received 
an offer of $85,000 for his property. Webster consults you, shows 
you the two letters and inquires whether he is obligated to convey 
his property to Bane. 
What should you advise? 
9. .·Roj ax Corporation is a Virginia corporation with principal 
offices in James City County, doing business as a lumberyard 
and supplier of millwork. During 1977 and 1978, one of its busiest 
customers was Central Construction Co., a general contractor which 
was aggressively striving to build up the volume of its business. 
During 1978, Central secured a contract with James City County 
for construction of a public elementary school, scheduled for com-
pletion in August of 1979. It also contracted with the proper 
officials of the Eighth Baptist Church for the construction of a 
new church building. The church was also scheduled for completion 
in the summer of 1979. In addition, in January of 1979, Central 
commenced construction of a commercial office building, which was 
expected to be finished in six months. Rojax furnished lumber and 
millwork for each of the three jobs. 
Plagued by rising interest· cos.ts, delays caused by unusuq.lly. 
heavy rains, and a shortage of masonry products, all three jobs 
were losing money for Central. In addition, the owners were having 
their own troubles, and payments to Central were not made on time 
or in full. This caused Central to withhold payments from Rojax 
for supplies furnished in February and March of 1979. Matters 
grew worse until work on all three jobs was terminated prior to 
completion. Work was stopped on the office building on April 10th, 
on the school building on April 25th and on the church on May 23rd. 
Negotiations among the parties were carried out during May 
and June without success. Finally, on July 15th, Rojax became 
convinced that further negotiation was useless and-consulted you, 
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itjquiring whether it could then file a memorandum of mechanics 
liert, and enforce the lien on each of the three jobs. How should 
you advise Rojax as to (a) the office building, (b) the school, 
and (c) the church? 
* * * * * 
10. Beth· and Bob Benson were married in Seattle, Washington 
in 1974. Bob's earnings were less than he and Beth had expected 
and ·ia great deal of tension developed between the two. They couldn't 
afford to and didn't have any children and Beth was obliged to 
take a job as a salesperson, which she grew to dislike heartily. 
Eventually, their prospects seemed so dim to Beth that she moved 
out of their home on August 20, 1977, and moved in with a girl-
friend who lived in Spokane, Washington. She never saw Bob after 
she moved out of their home. On March 10, 1979, she moved to 
Staunton, Virginia where she found employment, rented a small house, 
and as she put it, settled down for the rest of her life. Shortly 
thereafter she met a most attractive young man who proposed marriage 
to her. 
Beth contacted Bob Benson, who still lived in Seattle, advis-
ing him that she intended to file suit for divorce. He agreed to 
accept service o-f process and agreed not to contest her suit· for 
divorce if she would bear the expenses, seek no alimony, and make 
no allegations of cruelty on his part. On July 15, 1979, she 
advises you of the foregoing and inquires (a) whether she has grounds 
for a divorce in Virginia; (b) if so, how soon may suit be commenced 
and (c) may Bob Benson legally accept service of process? How would 
you advise her as to e~ch question? 
* * * ·k * 
